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ABSTRACT In fragile social and economic societies, water governance systems have rarely
managed to meet everyone’s needs, but rather misrecognised the demand of those excluded
from decision-making structures. Across regions, underlying socio-political issues have often
remained unaddressed on the basis that water scarcity is primarily caused by geo-climatic
conditions. Exclusionary governance is one central driver to migratory patterns along with
instabilities in political regimes. It is reﬂected in poor service provision and tends to perpe-
tuate injustices. Several commitments of the New Urban Agenda (NUA) set objectives of
universal and equitable water provision through multi-stakeholder involvement in urban
planning processes. It thereby demonstrates efforts deployed towards ‘good governance’ for
transparent, accountable and participatory decision-making. However, several studies have
pointed out the questionable role of citizens in NUA. Building on their argument, the present
article reﬂects on exclusionary patterns that the NUA aims to tackle and the mechanisms it
proposes to achieve this. This article aims to highlight how power relations in water gov-
ernance produce and reproduce exclusion in access, such as through population movements.
It questions how NUA envisions water governance structures based on collaboration
between multiple stakeholders in different contexts, and highlights the need to scrutinise the
people-centric language adopted in its commitments. With references to water politics from
Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, it adopts a political
ecology approach looking at questions of inclusivity for marginalised groups and discusses
approaches for the active involvement of these people in water governance models.
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Recognising the growing challenges regarding so-called‘water scarcity’ in cities, the New Urban Agenda (NUA)makes multiple commitments regarding water resources in
terms of sustainable and just management, as well as in dis-
tribution (United Nations, 2017). However, the NUA’s frame-
work for governance and its implications need to be scrutinised
carefully. Roberts (2008) argues that water governance structures
often portray a reductionist concept of the city, and deny political
disputes and inequalities in producing problems and perpetuating
failures. Ioris (2012; 2016) adds to this that the city cannot be
understood without reference to the political struggles and alli-
ances that play a critical part in its own organisation.
Aligning with these positions, this article seeks discussions on
past and future implications of water governance challenges in
cities in light of the NUA. In Part 2, it advocates for the need to
tackle dominance and exclusion in water governance. It argues
that water scarcity issues are exacerbated by socio-political
oppressions rather than climate and/or demographic conditions,
while population movements makes these linkages more complex.
In Part 3, the paper uses historical water management models to
reﬂect on the potential of the NUA to foster changes in gov-
ernance structures, especially in regard to multi-stakeholder
approaches. It then explores how patterns of exclusion can be
broken through collaborative processes in order to structurally
address these issues. References to Latin America and the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region are made to illustrate the
need to envision roles for water users as right-bearers in context-
speciﬁc water governance systems.
‘Water governance’ is deﬁned here as the institutional pro-
cesses involving different actors and networks, and setting rules
for them. As opposed to a focus on outcomes (on policies for
example), governance is explored in terms of processes of dialo-
gue, negotiations and the way these evolve with time. Such pro-
cesses would, in principle, consider different positions and
negotiate trade-offs. ‘Water management’ is deﬁned as the
application of governance rules and the operationalisation of
policies with the practical aspects of water allocation, preservation
and restoration (Hill, 2013).
The text refers to ‘citizens’ and ‘communities’ while attempting
to avoid homogenisation of groups. It argues that understanding
social, cultural and political diversities is crucial to recognise the
variety of people’s needs, the conditions in which these are
unmet, and the political structures in which they are claiming
them. This is particularly important in the context of interna-
tional population movements, where the term ‘citizen’ may be no
longer relevant to refer to inhabitants of a particular city or town,
without bearing the same legal rights as natives or naturalised
individuals, but who remain legitimate in claiming unmet basic
needs. Inclusive governance refers to the active involvement of
stakeholders who hold different interests and responsibilities in
institutional decision-making systems, and particularly that of
marginalised populations.
Water as a mirror of exclusion
A most contested liquid. Water has various functions and values
according to different people. Considered as a biophysical
necessity for both humans and ecosystems, a religious symbol, an
aesthetic reference, an economic input and a public service, water
is source of conﬂicts for ownership and management (Bakker,
2011). Essential to all societies but limited in quantity and
impossible to replace, water requires sharing arrangements.
Complex governance systems for water common resources are
thus put in place; in principle, to meet everyone’s most basic
needs.
Building on Miranda et al. (2011) four principal discourses on
water management are identiﬁed here:
1. To those considering water as an economic good or a
commodity (i.e., with an economic value), water governance
should be centred on market principles and usually involve
the private sector (see for example World Bank, 2005 and
Marin, 2009);
2. Where water is valued as a social good or human right, the
social aspects of governance are primordial and involve
access to resources and services by all. This view emphasises
the need to actively involve the civil society in decision-
making;
3. Where water is not only considered as a right to humans but
also to other living beings, it can be referred to as a socio-
ecological good. In water governance, this is translated into
the fulﬁlment of public interests whilst attempting to include
nature as an entity with its own right;
4. Other consider water as a sector. This discourse emphasises
the need for efﬁcient management of water services, often
with a river basin management approach (see for example
IWA, 2016). This proposes the most hybrid approach, based
on the argument that the above views on water management
are not mutually exclusive. It integrates economic and social
concerns with a focus on management as a supply and
demand equation. It has more recently embraced the notion
of environmental services to preserve upstream water for
downstream services.
Divergence of views constitutes the bases of water governance
disputes, where government agencies and political parties, civil
organisations and NGOs adhere to different principles, values,
culture and interests (Rogers and Hall, 2003). Opinions, stakes
and discourses may obviously vary from one actor to another
within one entity, but disputes and competition between groups
serving conﬂicting interests remains a fundamental challenge to
address. With the existence of such diversity of views, the
challenge lies in deﬁning common objectives and in establishing
management models upon these objectives.
In addition, geo-climatic constraints lead people to organise
and enter into competition for water appropriation and usage.
The transboundary aspect of resources makes disputes occur at
multiple scales (‘hydro-political tensions’), from the local to the
global (De Stefano et al., 2017). Therefore, physical characteristics
determine social interactions, from which relations of cooperation
or domination emerge. These provide a basis for creation of the
institutional and managerial systems that articulate water
governance objectives. Where disparities occur, the struggle for
access and control leads to the emergence of power holders. As
conceptualised by Swyngedouw (2004, p. 4), ﬂows of power
evolve in the same direction as urban water circulation, thereby
determining the direction of “the right to water”.
As such, water captures, embodies and re-produces socio-
political processes. In unbalanced power relationships, elites take
decisions for water management structures and systems. Political
ecologists argue that these decisions rarely reﬂect all stakeholders’
interests, or worse, oppress those of the marginalised. Top-down
decision-making planning privileging ‘winners’ run the risk of
reinforcing the exclusion of ‘losers’. This is particularly true in
vertical structures inﬂuenced by neoliberal, post-colonial and
market globalisation approaches (Loftus, 2009; Ioris, 2016).
Water governance and population movements. Causal links
between water access, climate change, population displacements,
institutional capacities, and governance systems are complex to
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0133-5
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 4:76 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0133-5 | www.nature.com/palcomms
identify. For example, do people whose economic income
depends on climate conditions migrate as a result of more fre-
quent and intense droughts, or because institutions are not able to
put in place systems for more efﬁcient and more equitable water
distribution? Discourses used by decision-makers and found in
the media and non-governmental reports sometimes use climate
change, population movements or economic crises to justify
failures in water service provision. This depolitisation of water
issues runs the risk of perpetuating oppression by masking socio-
political factors. The two following parts attempt to revisit the
causalities between water governance, migration and displace-
ment (urban-rural and from city to city, nationally and inter-
nationally), and to highlight needs to identify discourses that hide
patterns of exclusion.
The World Resources Institute (2016; in SIWI, 2016) states that
water scarcity is cited with increasing frequency as a signiﬁcant
multiplying factor prompting migration. In fact, more and more
studies recognise people migrate as a result of deterioration of
their social and environmental conditions, and not solely because
they are in search of better social and economic opportunities
(EJF, 2017; Miletto et al., 2017; Boano et al., 2008). Multiple
historical cases therefore show that migrants pulled by urban
areas where they seek better opportunities to meet their needs and
beyond could in fact having been pushed by poor conditions of
services where they come from, and not only in contexts of forced
displacement.
On urban-rural migration, Tacoli et al. (2015) differentiate
groups of migrants: for example those moving permanently for
employment and/or education purposes, those moving on a
seasonal basis and who usually form the poorest rural groups, and
those who lose their livelihoods due to escalating risks. The latest
tend to make displacements permanent due to the perception of
future risks, including climate-related risks (Warner, 2010). Toli
(2016) reports that in MENA, one of the world’s driest regions,
inter-regional migration of the youth particularly occurs from
rural to urban settings. Those with sufﬁcient ﬁnancial means
leave their country by crossing borders but climate-related
migratory ﬂuxes mainly take place within countries. For people
whose income depends largely on water, for example in
agriculture, unreliable water supply leads to the loss of their jobs
because their income stability is compromised (Miletto et al.,
2017). To people who have few adaptation options in situ,
migration is a coping strategy ensuring remittances for the
survival of families.
Droughts tend to be unquestionably perceived as a direct
contributing factor for migration, and studies have often failed to
unpack socio-political drivers inherent to failing governance
systems (Owain and Maslin, 2018). Political discourses presenting
drought as a cause of migration contribute to the ‘naturalisation’
of scarcity, failing to account for the institutional and managerial
issues that explain why marginalised populations lack access to
water (Kaika, 2003). That means issues of water access are
attributed to ‘natural’ causes, when in fact water scarcity is a
combination of physical, infrastructural, institutional and political
challenges. Water scarcity discourses overlook underlying social
struggles and failed cooperation in water management. As argued
by Bulkeley et al. (2014) climate change, as a risk multiplier,
accelerates the injustice trend and adds a complex variable to the
equation.
Political waves and ripple effects. The exclusionary cycle rarely
ends with migration. If bad water governance is (at least in part)
causing displacement, it can also lead to further issues at the
migration destination. In many cities, migrants share similar
disadvantages to the existing urban poor. Tacoli et al. (2015)
argue this exclusion is directly related to the types of settlements
they live in. Migrants who live in worst-quality informal settle-
ments (for example temporary structures on public land on the
urban periphery), have limited access to public infrastructure and
services (Scott, 2013; Murillo, 2014). Despite the demonstrated
beneﬁts of inclusive policies, migrants are often unfairly blamed
for increasing poverty, while they actually face further or new
exclusion patterns.
There is a real policy challenge for local and national
governments which may be unable or unwilling to provide
services to those most in need. International laws and conven-
tions may not be effectively enforced and ensure displaced and
vulnerable populations’ protection. In extreme cases of climate-
induced or conﬂict-induced displacement, the international law
has not yet been conferring clear rights to people ﬂeeing home.
Refugees and internally displaced populations, as opposed to
migrants, are forced to move away from home. Ongoing and
complex debates occur on how the 1951 Geneva Convention for
political refugees and the UN Refugee Convention could legally
recognise the concept of ‘climate refugee’ and thereby help
displacement challenges to be addressed within an institutional
structure. The principle of non-refoulement – where states are
forbidden to oblige migrants to return to life-threatening
situations – could apply, but only to speciﬁc situations
(Fernández, 2015).
The NUA makes a commitment in Article 28 to “ensure full
respect for the human rights of refugees, internally displaced
persons and migrants, regardless of their migration status”. But
there is no clear deﬁnition in NUA to clarify what the terms
“refugees”, “internally displaced persons” and “migrants” entail.
While so-called climate-induced displacements are closely linked
to social and political factors, the recognition, deﬁnition and
characterisation of such drivers in legal tools poses signiﬁcant
problems. Besides, as a non-binding agreement, NUA does not
provide legal obligation for action. Such debates will increase in
complexity if causes of displacement remain ambiguous in
political discourses. This is at the risk of maintaining status-quo
in decision-making where oppressions are produced and
reproduced in traditional governance models, in which power
relations are poorly articulated.
Synergies in water governance
Models and ideologies. The 1960s marked the period where mass
production and consumption started to be questioned. This led to
ideologies of societal response to coercive force applied by the
state to prevent the tragedy of environmental resource destruc-
tion. Inspired by Hobbes’ Leviathan, this reﬂected a liberal atti-
tude towards governance, where governments were required to
intervene on the control of natural resources, including water
(Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). Centralised control and regulation
were particularly applied in low-income countries. However,
state-led water governance appeared to face crucial challenges in
many of them. Insufﬁcient coverage rates, under-investment,
deterioration of infrastructure and unresponsiveness to the needs
of the poor widened social inequalities (Bakker, 2011).
The ideology of a ‘command and control’ hierarchal system
acting in the interest of society faded and was replaced by free-
market liberal ideologies. In this regime, the state’s role is to
guarantee free operation of market forces. Proponents of
privatisation have asserted that where the government had failed,
the private sector could perform better by providing more ﬁnance
and expertise. In the water sector, that was assuming that
privately run utilities would ensure efﬁciency while seeking
maximised commercial returns. With the perspective of ‘water as
a commodity’, proponents claimed that treating water as an
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economic good could also facilitate the implementation of
environmentally-friendly regulations (McCarthy and Prudham,
2004)
In line with neoliberal principles emerging in the 1980s, a
global wave of privatisation took place in the water sector. Rooted
in similar objectives of performance and above all, investment,
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) became common arrange-
ments. International Finance Institutions (e.g., World Bank,
International Monetary Fund) were particularly advocating for
PPPs, which led to structural reforms being adopted by
governments worldwide. These were driven by conditionalities
attached to loan agreements with funders (e.g. structural
adjustment programmes).
In Latin America, many countries adopted these strategies
following the oil crisis. Large-scale water infrastructure projects in
Peru, for example, were established by the national government in
partnership with foreign companies which would gain control on
water extraction, transport and distribution mechanisms (Salazar,
2011). However poor regulatory structures and ﬂawed contract
negotiations meant that privatisation projects and PPPs were
carrying high investment risks. Coverage and tariffs would
privilege speciﬁc urban areas, typically at the expense of the
low-incomes. Because of a lack of result in establishing an
accessible and sustainable system for water distribution protests
rose across the region. Neoliberal approaches became strongly
rejected, particularly by those considering water as a human right
should be free of charge, and disputing the impacts of
privatisation on equity (Davis, 2005; Harvey, 2005).
The exclusion of citizens from decision-making processes has
been historically recurrent in governance systems. Much criticism
has been addressed to state hierarchies and market systems for
their governing methods being imposed on civil society without
cooperation. Paternalistic and undemocratic practices have
involved the exercise of power by political and economic actors
who have sought to deﬁne the ends and means to be pursued by
the society. The race for large-scale infrastructure and poorly
planned network extensions required high capital costs that were
difﬁcult to meet as populations could not afford to pay for
services associated to such investment. In Latin America, water
privatisation have caused issues which extended beyond the water
sector, from corruption to forced displacement of indigenous and
black populations, and led to social struggle (Castro, 2008).
The new urban agenda: a change catalyst?. As socio-political
problems water challenges require socio-political solutions. By
tackling exclusive patterns and focusing on collaboration, then
conﬂicts, population movements and further issues they entail
can be minimised. The NUA recognises that issues in water
supply and access go beyond ecological resource and physical
infrastructure management. It adopts what appears as an inclu-
sive discourse and acknowledges that equitable and affordable
access to water is a right and need that requires particular
attention to the vulnerable, and must be achieved through the
elimination of legal, institutional, socio-economic and physical
barriers.
Caprotti et al. (2017) warn against the reductionist approach
and numerous assumptions made in the NUA, for example on
the states’ capacities to deliver on multiple commitments.
Satterthwaite (2016) reminds us of the importance of keeping
NUA coherent, and more importantly advocates for more power
transfer to actors (government and non-government actors) at
local level.
In what concerns water nevertheless, NUA advocates that the
sector requires stronger utilities as a necessary step to tackle
inequalities in access to water, and commits in addressing this in
Article 120:
“We will work to equip public water and sanitation utilities
with the capacity to implement sustainable water manage-
ment systems, including sustainable maintenance of urban
infrastructure services, through capacity development, with
the goal of progressively eliminating inequalities and
promoting both universal and equitable access to safe and
affordable drinking water for all and adequate and equitable
sanitation and hygiene for all.”
In this aspect, NUA proposes a utility-centric solution
(whether utilities are privately/semi-privately run, public, and
local, national or international) and makes the confusing
assumption that this will integrate people-centric solutions.
Furthermore, the document makes explicit commitment
towards integrated water resources planning and management
through the participation of multiple stakeholders including that
of communities. Article 72 reads:
“We commit ourselves to long-term urban and territorial
planning processes and spatial development practices that
incorporate integrated water resources planning and
management, considering the urban-rural continuum on
the local and territorial scales and including the participa-
tion of relevant stakeholders and communities.”
Despite the questionable distinction between “communities”
and “relevant stakeholders” such as in Article 72, citizens hold an
important place throughout the agenda, which could be
translated as an interest in achieving social justice in urban
areas. But the appropriation of people-centric language without
genuine inclusive intension runs the risk of re-producing
exclusive patterns once again. On this recurrent trend, Ioris
(2016, p. 279) argues: “one main problem is that public
participation has been appropriated by the same agencies that
in the past promoted highly centralised, disjointed and politically
asymmetric administration”.
Caprotti et al. (2017, p. 9) point out the ambiguous active role
of urban citizens in NUA and argue that this consists more in
envisioning their role according to institutional plans rather than
as citizens in their own rights. For example, they highlight the
way “digital citizens” are being produced behind inclusionary
discourses, and this in order to participate in data collection
mechanisms for metrics-driven urban policies and politics. In
fact, this contrasts with the participation of citizens for the sake of
genuinely understanding their desires and aspirations.
While there is mainstream acknowledgement in the literature
that governance should be shaped with multi-stakeholder
approaches, it is less obvious to deﬁne the way this should occur.
NUA reﬂects this but remains rather silent on the way people can
be included. According to Hill (2013) ‘governance’ needs to
involve state and non-state actors, both private and public, and is
thus broader and more inclusive than ‘government’, as the state
autonomous authority. Governance must therefore transcend
state hierarchies and market systems (Amin, 1997).
In modern societies where dynamics are increasingly complex,
the question of ‘what entity should take decisions to govern
water?’ is rather obsolete. Good governance is often theoretically
described as a balanced partnership between the state, the market
and the civil society in order to achieve accountable, transparent,
participatory and decentralised decision-making (UNDP, 2011).
However in reality, governance is fundamentally characterised by
unbalanced power relations (Grifﬁn, 2013). Instead of seeking
symmetrical relationships, governance structures would rather
need to enable dynamics to exist, through which contestation can
occur, be heard and responded to. The following sections
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question what forms of partnerships can be envisaged to manage
water inclusively.
Envisioning inclusive approaches in Latin America. In view of
recurrent patterns of monopolisation in various water governance
systems, there is a need to envision an active role for people to
reclaim their right to water, through inclusive governance.
Building on Schlosberg (2009) who explores three dimensions of
environmental justice, namely distribution, recognition and par-
ticipation, Hofmann (2017, p. 71) argues that “focusing on
increased distribution of water and sanitation services without
enhancing recognition of the urban water-poor only partially
addresses the issue”. Distribution will be meaningful if the nature,
diversity and cultural contextualisation of needs are appropriately
recognised. Recognition in this sense, also acknowledges the
political construction of domination, and though this process, it
relieves both social oppression and distributional inequity.
The recognition of the lack of collective voice in decision-
making around water governance also invites for participation by
these same excluded populations. Participation has been widely
advocated for in the governance literature, around the basis that it
can support more effective and open social structures (Batchelor,
2007). Although a complex notion that has been deﬁned in
multiple manners, public participation is considered here as the
decision-making process in which the public is integrated
through active engagement, for example through direct negotia-
tions with representatives and through the co-design of strategies.
As such it is more powerful when it enables dialogue, rather than
for the ultimate goal of developing policies. In addition to
fulﬁlling people’s rights, participation should assure account-
ability and transparency through synergetic relationships between
stakeholders.
Across Latin American countries, market-oriented strategies
have been strongly rejected by the civil society. Searching for an
alternative to PPPs, Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia are some of
the states having put in place what is referred to as ‘water co-
production’, with formal arrangements between state agencies
and organised groups of citizens (Joshi and Moore, 2004; Llano-
Arias, 2015). Venezuela enacted a national policy in 2001 to
formalise existing local water committees, the Mesas Técnicas del
Agua. The Act established a coherent scheme that addressed
existing clashes between authorities, which were causing
deﬁciency of service, illegal taps and lack of pro-poor policies.
With the 2011 system, the state-owned utility holds ﬁnancial
obligation, while the community intervenes at all stages of
provision: needs assessment, diagnosis with professionals, design
of rehabilitation and expansion projects, monitoring and
maintenance. This was recognised as a major improvement for
service coverage, but also for the possibility given to communities
exercise rights and duties. In 2008, 93% of the national urban
population had access to water supply (Allen et al., 2017).
For many experts, water co-production has enabled citizens to
augment capacity to negotiate with the state, and increase
opportunities for wider democratic projects (Bovaird, 2007). This
has increased potential to ﬁnd alternatives in the way water is
managed and services delivered (Mitlin, 2008). However, others
have questioned the real impacts of water co-production if solely
sought as a practical mechanism for water delivery, and warned
about state entities devolving risk and responsibilities to people
(Boyle and Harris, 2009). The extent to which these governance
models can build local-level empowerment and be reproduced in
a manner it leads to transformative agendas depends on many
factors, including that of the underpinning incentives of ‘co-
producers’. On the case of Venezuela, Allen et al. (2017) explain
improved service coverage has alleviated thousands of people
from water poverty through service co-production, but this was
possible because of a long democratic struggle and a strong
commitment from the state.
Envisioning inclusive approaches in MENA. The involvement of
the civil society in decision-making processes can take multiple
forms and remains of course, dependent on the social and poli-
tical context. In MENA countries where socio-political structures
have evolved with their own history, people’s involvement in
water governance requires fundamentally different approaches to
inclusive governance than in Latin American countries. The
diversity of factors causing water issues is particularly complex in
MENA as water is simultaneously a cause of political conﬂict, a
mirror of institutional incapacity and a weapon of war resulting
in migration (e.g., in Syria; De Châtel, 2014).
In Jordan and Lebanon, where water has been predominantly
valued as an economic good, the governments have been seeking
a growing involvement from the private sector to address
multiple challenges (CDR, 2015; MWI, 2015, 2016). In contexts
of water shortages within country boundaries and where resource
management is not keeping up with consumption patterns,
refugee inﬂuxes from Syria have added complexity to the political
picture of service provision mechanisms. Tensions between
refugees and underserved host communities, added to resentment
towards utilities, have made relationships between people and
institutions in charge of water provision more difﬁcult. These
have further affected water systems in terms of connections,
payments and cost-revenue, frequency of supply, and network
maintenance (Diep et al., 2017).
Aiming at creating platforms for dialogue based on social
cohesion, a growing number of international and local NGOs,
have acted as bridges between stakeholders. As part of an aim to
ensure accountability and build trust, they have mediated
relationships between state-owned utilities in charge of water
provision and water users, including both refugees and host
communities who remain underserved with public services. This
has aligned with the perspective of shifting from sectorial
approaches focused on water production, to demand-
management approaches. In Lebanon, this has supported utilities’
understanding of and response to local needs, and people’s
willingness to subscribe to the network (GVC, 2016).
In structures where people have growing voice in negotiations,
or have a growing active role in decision-making processes,
stakeholders’ relationship is crucial to optimise the sustainability
and inclusivity aspects of governance. The clear distribution of
roles also helps distributing power dynamically in negotiations
and operations. Stronger local governance as stated in NUA, with
a growing role for people, should not lead to lower responsibilities
for state entities at national and local level and the private sector,
but a public and private involvement where roles are redeﬁned in
a way it gives space to the civil society. Good governance would
mean that state’s responsibilities are passed onto actors originat-
ing from the democratic arena and local actions articulated
through alliances with policy instruments.
Conclusion
Water governance requires mechanisms that work with power
dynamics, rather than a sole focus on production through
infrastructural development. As cities concentrate a complicated
mix of factors causing water challenges, it is more and more
important to highlight these dynamics in order to establish sys-
tems that will work with them. The NUA attempts to make a
coherent account of these needs. The challenge lies in going over
general statements and one-size ﬁt all solutions, and in activating
these agendas in various context. The “participation of relevant
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stakeholders and communities” (United Nations, 2017, p. 21) will
require different governance arrangements in different socio-
political contexts. The re-deﬁnition of power relations, answers to
people’s needs and inequality reduction will however depend on
the nature of the negotiation strategies deployed.
Without political willingness and mutually set agreements,
communication and collective action will not mechanically result
in just and equitable outcomes. As highlighted by Batchelor
(2007), questions of power inherently remain in negotiation
processes, even when third parties are acting as mediators.
Identifying those who beneﬁt and those who suffer from deci-
sions, even when taken from collaborative processes, is therefore
crucial to avoid masked abuses of power. This starts with explicit
recognition that social structures for access and control need to be
reconstructed in order to make space for those who have been
victims of repeated exclusion patterns. As politics require to
evolve with socio-environmental dynamics (“liquid politics”),
then the goal to meet when activating the New Urban Agenda for
water governance, is to build on existing systems with inclu-
sionary mechanisms.
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